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Abstract: This paper obtains the maximum principle for both stochastic (global) open-
loop and stochastic (global) closed-loop Stackelberg differential games. For the closed-loop
case, we use the theory of controlled forward-backward stochastic differential equations
to derive the maximum principle for the leader’s optimal strategy. In the special case of
the open-loop linear quadratic Stackelberg game, we consider the follower’s Hamiltonian
system as the leader’s state equation, derive the related stochastic Riccati equation, and
show the existence and uniqueness of the solution to the Riccati equation under appropri-
ate assumptions. However, for the closed-loop linear quadratic Stackelberg game, we can
write the related Riccati equation consisting of forward-backward stochastic differential
equations, while leaving the existence of its solution as an open problem.
Keywords: Stackelberg differential game, maximum principle, forward-backward stochas-
tic differential equation, Riccati equation.
1 Introduction
In 1934, H. von Stackelberg introduced a concept of a hierarchical solution for markets
where some firms have power of domination over others [28]. This solution concept is now
known as the Stackelberg equilibrium or the Stackelberg solution which, in the context of
two-person nonzero-sum static games, involves players with asymmetric roles, one leading
(called the leader) and the other following (called the follower). A Stackelberg game
proceeds with the leader announcing his policy prior to the start of the game. With the
knowledge of the leader’s strategy, the follower chooses a policy so as to optimize his
own performance index. The leader, anticipating the follower’s optimal response, picks
the policy which optimizes his performance index on the rational reaction curve of the
follower, which together with the corresponding policy of the follower is known as the
Stackelberg solution.
∗The first author is supported by WCU (World Class University) program through the National
Research Foundation of Korea funded by the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (R31 - 20007)
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In dynamic Stackelberg games, it becomes important to know the player’s information
sets at any given time. In this paper, we will consider two different information structures:
i) open-loop for both players and ii) closed-loop perfect state (CLPS) for both players.
Moreover, we will only treat global solution where the leader announces his entire strategy
at the start of the game and the follower reacts to the entire strategy. The solutions of
games with the first information structure will be termed (global) open-loop Stackelberg
solutions, whereas the solutions of the games with the second information structure will
be termed (global) closed-loop Stackelberg solutions. It is known that both these solu-
tions suffer from time inconsistency, which results from the functional dependence of the
follower’s optimal response strategy on the leader’s entire strategy on the duration of the
game.
In addition to these concepts, there is another concept of feedback Stackelberg solution,
where the Stackelberg property is retained at every stage (in the discrete-time setting)
with the leader having only stagewise advantage over the follower. Since the continuous-
time problem can be viewed as the number of stages becomes unbounded in any finite
interval, stagewise advantage of the leader over the follower turns into instantaneous
advantage. A good aspect of this solution is that it is time consistent. Readers interested
in the theory and applications of this solution can refer to [2], [7], [10], [12], [13] and [14].
In an open-loop or closed-loop Stackelberg differential game, the follower aims at
minimizing his cost functional in accordance with the leader’s strategy on the whole
duration of the game. Anticipating the follower’s optimal response depending on his
entire strategy, the leader chooses an optimal one in advance to minimize his own cost
functional, based on the Hamiltonian system satisfied by the follower’s optimal response.
The difference between the two kinds of games is whether the information sets of the
players involve the history of the state. The introduction of the history of the state in the
closed-loop Stackelberg game, even in the deterministic case, makes it difficult to tackle,
as the follower may not obtain his optimal response if the leader’s announced strategy
incorporates the memory of the state. Two approaches to circumvent this difficulty are
introduced: the team approach and the maximum principle. For the former, one can refer
to [1], [6] in the discrete-time setting and [19], [21], [22] and [4] in the continuous-time
setting. For the latter, one can refer to [20] for nonclassical control problems arising from
Stackelberg games. The idea of team approach is as follows: the leader first minimizes his
cost functional over the controls of both the leader and the follower, yielding a lower bound
on his cost functional and the team strategies for both players. Then the leader makes an
effort to find a closed-loop strategy such that the follower’s optimal response and the state
trajectory will coincide with his team strategy and the team optimal trajectory, which
leads to the lower bound on the leader’s cost functional. The maximum principle approach
restricts the leader’s strategy to depend only on the initial state and the current state
(memoryless perfect state information structure) and a nonclassical control problem faced
by the leader is solved. It is worth noting that in this case, the follower’s adjoint equation
involves the derivative of the leader’s strategy with respect to the state. Therefore, after
incorporating the follower’s adjoint variable as an augmented state, the leader encounters
a nonclassical control problem with the feature that both the control and its derivative
with respect to the state appear in the controlled forward-backward ordinary differential
equation system. The authors provide two approaches to tackle this problem and give the
necessary conditions satisfied by the leader’s optimal strategy. One is to directly apply
2
the variational technique to the state system with mixed-boundary conditions (the adjoint
equation of the follower with a terminal condition). The other is to establish an equivalent
relationship between such a nonclassical control problem and a classical control problem,
which yields that the optimal strategy could be found in the space of affine functions.
The phenomenon of time inconsistency is also analyzed by the authors. We will elaborate
on the technical details and generalize their result to the stochastic setting in section 4.
For the stochastic formulation of Stackelberg games involving white noise terms, Yong
[30] studies the open-loop linear quadratic case, with control variables appearing in diffu-
sion term of the state. To give a state feedback representation of the open-loop Stackelberg
solution (in a non-anticipating way), the related Riccati equation is derived and sufficient
conditions for the existence of its solution with deterministic coefficients are discussed.
More recently, Øksendal et al [18] have considered a general stochastic open-loop Stack-
elberg differential game, proved a sufficient maximum principle, and applied the theory
to continuous-time newsvendor problems.
In this paper, we study stochastic global Stackelberg differential games with open-
loop and closed-loop information structures. As we shall see, the problems confronted by
the leader in both cases, from the current point of view, are control problems with the
state equations being forward-backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs). The
theories for nonlinear backward stochastic differential equations (BSDEs) and FBSDEs
have been extensively studied over the last two decades following the initial work by
Pardoux and Peng [23]. One can refer to, among others, [15], [16], [24], [26], [31], and the
references therein, for the development of the theory of FBSDEs and their applications.
With the help of the results in optimization problems for controlled FBSDEs (see, e.g.,
[27] and [32]), we obtain the maximum principle for the leader’s optimal strategies in
stochastic global Stackelberg games, and discuss linear quadratic problems as well as the
corresponding Riccati equations.
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we formulate a stochastic Stackelberg
game and give three types of concepts of equilibria. In section 3 we present the maximum
principle for a stochastic open-loop Stackelberg game. In section 4 we focus on a stochas-
tic closed-loop Stackelberg game and derive a maximum principle for the leader’s optimal
strategy. As examples, linear quadratic stochastic open-loop and closed-loop Stackelberg
games are studied in section 5. For the open-loop linear quadratic case, we show the exis-
tence and uniqueness of the solution to the associated stochastic Riccati equation under
some assumptions. For the closed-loop case, we simply derive a new Riccati equation
consisting of FBSDEs, without investigating the issue of the existence of its solution.
2 Problem formulation and definition of equilibria
Let (Ω,F , P ) be a complete probability space on which is defined a d-dimensional standard
Brownian motion {W (t), 0 ≤ t ≤ T}. {Ft}0≤t≤T is the natural filtration generated by
W and augmented by all the P -null sets in F and P is the predictable sub-σ-field of
B([0, T ])× F .
We consider a stochastic differential system{
dx(t) = f(t, x(t), u(t), v(t))dt+ σ(t, x(t))dW (t),
x(0) = x0,
(2.1)
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where
f : Ω× [0, T ]× Rn × Rm1 × Rm2 → Rn,
σ : Ω× [0, T ]× Rn → Rn×d,
are P × B(Rn+m1+m2)/B(Rn) and P × B(Rn)/B(Rn×d) measurable, respectively, and
(u(·), v(·)) are the decision variables of the leader and the follower, respectively. The
cost functionals for the leader and the follower to minimize are described as follows
J1(u, v) = E[
∫ T
0
g1(t, x(t), u(t), v(t))dt+G1(X(T ))],
J2(u, v) = E[
∫ T
0
g2(t, x(t), u(t), v(t))dt+G2(x(T ))],
with
gi : Ω× [0, T ]× R
n × U × V → R,
Gi : Ω× R
n → R,
i = 1, 2, being P × B(Rn) × B(U) × B(V )/B(R) and FT × B(R
n)/B(R) measurable,
respectively.
According to the player’s information sets at any given time, there are three types
of Stackelberg games: (global) open-loop, (global) closed-loop, and feedback Stackelberg
games.
Open-loop games: In an open-loop Stackelberg game, the leader’s information set
at time t is {x0,Ft}. Therefore, the strategy u announced by the leader is an Ft-adapted
process. The follower aims at minimizing his cost functional J2(u, v) in accordance with
the leader’s strategy u on the whole duration of the game. His optimal response Φ(u) will
be an adapted process such that
J2(u,Φ(u)) ≤ J2(u, v), ∀ u, v.
The leader, anticipating the follower’s optimal response Φ, picks the policy u∗ which
optimizes his performance index on the rational reaction curve of the follower, i.e.,
J1(u
∗,Φ(u∗)) ≤ J1(u,Φ(u)), ∀ u.
(u∗,Φ(u∗)) is a Stackelberg solution for an open-loop game.
Closed-loop games: In a closed-loop Stackelberg game, the information set for the
leader at time t is {Ft, xs, s ∈ [0, t]} (closed-loop perfect state information). The strategy
that the leader adopts now can incorporate the history information of the state. Since
in general it is difficult for the follower to obtain his optimal response if the leader’s
announced strategy incorporates the whole history of the state, we only consider the
closed-loop case under the memoryless perfect state information pattern, i.e., the infor-
mation set of the leader at time t is {x0, xt,Ft}. For leader’s each strategy u(t, x0, x),
which is now a stochastic field, the follower tries to find his optimal response Ψ(u) such
that
J2(u,Ψ(u)) ≤ J2(u, v), ∀ u, v.
Taking into account the follower’s optimal response, the leader should choose u∗ such that
J1(u
∗,Ψ(u∗) ≤ J1(u,Ψ(u)), ∀ u.
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(u∗,Ψ(u∗)) is a Stackelberg solution for a closed-loop game.
Feedback games: In a feedback Stackelberg game, the information set for the leader
at time t is {xt,Ft} (feedback pattern). The significant mechanism difference between
feedback games and the former two types of games is that the advantage of the leader
over the follower in a feedback Stackelberg game is instantaneous not global, as the dif-
ferential game could be viewed as the limit of the discrete-time game as the number
of stages becomes unbounded (see [2]). Therefore, corresponding to the leader’s instan-
taneous strategy u(t, x), the follower will make an instantaneous response of the form
v(t, x, u(t, x)), which depends on the current state and the leader’s current action. A
feedback solution is a pair of strategies (u∗, v∗) such that
J1(u
∗, v∗(u∗)) ≤ J1(u, v
∗(u)), ∀ u,
J2(u
∗, v∗(u∗)) ≤ J2(u
∗, v(u∗)). ∀ v.
From the definition we can see that the feedback Stackelberg solution has some equilibrium
feature, whereas the open-loop or closed-loop solution involves a sequential optimization
at the level of the follower and the leader.
3 Stochastic open-loop Stackelberg differential games
We first introduce some notations. For two vectors x and y in Rn, 〈x, y〉 means the inner
product
∑n
i=1 xiyi. For a function f defined on R
n, Df or ∂f means the gradient of f .
Here we specify that throughout this paper all the vectors are column vectors and the
gradient of a scalar function f is ∂f
∂x
= ( ∂f
∂x1
, · · · , ∂f
∂xn
)⊤, while the gradient of a vector
function f = (f1, · · · , fm)
⊤ is a matrix
∂f
∂x
=


∂f1
∂x1
· · · ∂f1
∂xn
...
...
...
∂fm
∂x1
· · · ∂fm
∂xn

 .
We further introduce two spaces of adapted processes to be used in the definition of the
solution to a FBSDE,
S2(0, T ;Rn) := {ψ| ψ : Ω× [0, T ]→ Rn is a continous adapted process such that
E sup
0≤t≤T
|ψ(t)|2 <∞},
M2(0, T ;Rn) := {ψ| ψ : Ω× [0, T ]→ Rn is an adapted process such that
E
∫ T
0
|ψ(t)|2dt <∞}.
And the above two spaces will be simply written as S2 and M2, respectively, if no con-
fusion arises.
The admissible strategy spaces for the leader and the follower are denoted by
U = {u|u : Ω× [0, T ]→ U is Ft-adapted and E
∫ T
0
|u(t)|2dt < +∞},
V = {v|v : Ω× [0, T ]→ V is Ft-adapted and E
∫ T
0
|v(t)|2dt < +∞},
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where U and V are subsets of Rm1 and Rm2 .
For the completeness of this paper, we state the formulation of general stochastic open-
loop Stackelberg games and the corresponding maximum principle. From the definition
in section 2, given the leader’s strategy u ∈ U , the follower is faced the stochastic control
problem
min
v∈V
J2(u, v) = E[
∫ T
0
g2(t, x(t), u(t), v(t))dt+G2(x(T ))]
subject to {
dx(t) = f(t, x(t), u(t), v(t))dt+ σ(t, x(t))dW (t),
x(0) = x0.
Suppose there exists a unique solution v∗(u(·)) ∈ V to the above problem for each u ∈ U .
If we define
H2(t, x, u, v, p2, q2) := 〈p2, f(t, x, u, v)〉+ 〈q2, σ(t, x)〉+ g2(t, x, u, v),
then the maximum principle (see [33]) yields that there exists a pair of adapted processes
(p2, q2) ∈ S
2 ×M2 such that

dx(t) =f(t, x(t), u(t), v∗(t))dt+ σ(t, x(t))dW (t),
−dp2(t) =
{
(
∂f
∂x
)⊤(t, x(t), u(t), v∗(t))p2(t) + (
∂σ
∂x
)⊤(t, x(t))q2(t)
+
∂g2
∂x
(t, x(t), u(t), v∗(t))
}
dt− q2(t)dW (t),
x(0) =x0, p2(T ) =
∂G2
∂x
(x(T )),
v∗(t) =argmin
v∈V
H2(t, x(t), u(t), v, p2(t), q2(t)).
(3.1)
We assume that by the last equation in (3.1) a function v = v∗(t, x, u, p2) is implicitly
and uniquely defined. After substituting v = v∗(t, x, u, p2) into the follower’s maximum
principle, we get the control problem faced by the leader
min
u∈U
J1(u) = E[
∫ T
0
g1(t, x(t), u(t), v
∗(t, x(t), u(t), p2(t)))dt+G1(X(T ))]
subject to

dx(t) =f(t, x(t), u(t), v∗(t, x(t), u(t), p2(t)))dt+ σ(t, x(t))dW (t),
−dp2(t) =
{
(
∂f
∂x
)⊤(t, x(t), u(t), v∗(t, x(t), u(t), p2(t)))p2(t) + (
∂σ
∂x
)⊤(t, x(t))q2(t)
+
∂g2
∂x
(t, x(t), u(t), v∗(t, x(t), u(t), p2(t)))
}
dt− q2(t)dW (t),
x(0) =x0, p2(T ) =
∂G2
∂x
(x(T )).
(3.2)
We denote
H1(t, u, x, y, p1, p2, q1, q2)
=〈p1, f(t, x, u, v
∗(t, x, u, p2))〉+ 〈q1, σ(t, x)〉+ g1(t, x, u, v
∗(t, x, u, p2))
− 〈y, (
∂f
∂x
)⊤(t, x, u, v∗(t, x, u, p2))p2 + (
∂σ
∂x
)⊤(t, x)q2 +
∂g2
∂x
(t, x, u, v∗(t, x, u, p2))〉.
(3.3)
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Suppose u∗ is an optimal strategy for the leader. Then the maximum principle for con-
trolled forward-backward stochastic differential equations (see, e.g., [27] or [32]) yields
that there exists a triple of adapted processes (p1, q1, y) such that
u∗(t) = argminH1(t, u, x(t), y(t), p1(t), p2(t), q1(t), q2(t)), (3.4)
and 

dy(t) =−
∂H1
∂p2
dt−
∂H1
∂q2
dW (t),
=− {(
∂f
∂v
∂v∗
∂p2
)⊤p1 −
∂f
∂x
y −
n∑
i=1
yi(
∂v∗
∂p2
)⊤
∂
∂v
(
∂f
∂xi
)⊤p2
− (
∂2g2
∂x∂v
∂v∗
∂p2
)⊤y + (
∂v∗
∂p2
)⊤
∂g1
∂v
}dt−
∂σ
∂x
ydW (t),
dp1(t) =−
∂H1
∂x
dt+ q1dW (t)
=− {
∂f
∂x
+
∂f
∂v
∂v∗
∂x
+ (
∂σ
∂x
)⊤q1 +
∂g1
∂x
+ (
∂v∗
∂x
)⊤
∂g1
∂v
−
∑
i
yi[
∂
∂x
(
∂f
∂xi
)⊤ + (
∂v∗
∂x
)⊤
∂
∂v
(
∂f
∂xi
)⊤]p2
−
∑
i
yi
∂
∂x
(
∂σ
∂xi
)⊤q2 − (
∂2g2
∂x2
+
∂2g2
∂x∂v
∂v∗
∂x
)⊤y}dt+ q1dW (t),
y(0) =0, p1(T ) = −
∂2G2
∂x2
(x(T ))y(T ) +
∂G1
∂x
(x(T )).
(3.5)
4 Stochastic closed-loop Stackelberg games
In this section, we consider a stochastic closed-loop Stackelberg game which is a stochastic
version of the paper [20]. The difference between open-loop Stackelberg games and closed-
loop Stackelberg games is that in the former case the leader’s information set is the
σ-field Ft generated by the Brownian motion W , whereas in the latter case the leader’s
information set involves both the σ-field Ft and the history of the state x. As stated in the
introduction, the difficulty of studying closed-loop Stackelberg games arises from the fact
that the reaction of the follower can not be determined explicitly if the leader’s strategy
depends on the whole history of the state (CLPS information structure). However, if the
leader’s strategy is restricted to be memoryless, i.e., only the current state is involved
in the strategy, Papavassilopoulos and Cruz [20] provide an efficient way to solve such a
problem. As demonstrated in [20], the derivative ∂u
∂x
of the leader’s strategy u will appear
in the follower’s adjoint equation and further in the leader’s augmented state equation,
which makes the leader’s control problem a nonclassical one.
4.1 The deterministic case revisited
Since we apply the approach in Papavassilopoulos and Cruz [20] to solve the stochastic
version of closed-loop Stackelberg games, we fist elaborate their techniques in this sub-
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section. The state and the cost functionals for the leader and the follower are as follows{
x˙(t) = f(t, x(t), u(t), v(t)),
x(0) = x0,
(4.1)
J1(u, v) =
∫ T
0
g1(t, x(t), u(t), v(t))dt+G1(xT ),
J2(u, v) =
∫ T
0
g2(t, x(t), u(t), v(t))dt+G2(xT ).
(4.2)
Given the leader’s strategy u(t, x)t∈[0,T ] (we omit to write the dependence on the initial
state x0) which is continuously differentiable in x, if the follower’s optimal response is
v∗, then according to the deterministic maximum principle, there exists a function p such
that 

x˙ = f(t, x, u, v∗),
− p˙ = (
∂f
∂x
+
∂f
∂u
∂u
∂x
)⊤p+
∂g2
∂x
+ (
∂u
∂x
)⊤
∂g2
∂u
,
∂g2
∂v
+
∂f
∂v
p = 0,
x(0) = x0, p(T ) =
∂G2(x(T ))
∂x
.
(4.3)
Suppose we can get the unique solution
v = ϕ(t, x, p, u) (4.4)
from solving
∂g2
∂v
+
∂f
∂v
p = 0.
Then, after substituting the expression (4.4) into (4.3) and J1, the leader will be faced
with the following problem
min
u
J1(u) =
∫ T
0
g1(t, x, u, ϕ(t, x, p, u))dt+G1(xT ) (4.5)
subject to 

x˙ = f(t, x, u, ϕ(t, x, p, u)),
−p˙ = [
∂f
∂x
+
∂f
∂u
∂u
∂x
]⊤p +
∂g2
∂x
+ (
∂u
∂x
)⊤
∂g2
∂u
,
x(0) = x0, p(T ) =
∂G2(x(T ))
∂x
.
(4.6)
Since the derivative ∂u
∂x
of the control variable u is involved in the adjoint equation (4.6),
the above problem is a nonclassical one. The authors provide two approaches to overcome
this difficulty. One is the direct application of variational techniques. The other one
is more interesting, which reveals the relative independence of u and ∂u
∂x
and the time
inconsistency property. To be more precise, with ∂u
∂x
replaced by another new control
variable u˜, they construct a new classical problem
min
u,u˜
J˜1(u) =
∫ T
0
g1(t, x, u, ϕ(t, x, p, u))dt+G1(xT ) (4.7)
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subject to 

x˙ = f(t, x, u, ϕ(t, x, p, u)),
−p˙ = (
∂f
∂x
+
∂f
∂u
u˜)⊤p+
∂g2
∂x
+ (u˜)⊤
∂g2
∂u
,
x(0) = x0, p(T ) =
∂G2(x(T ))
∂x
,
(4.8)
and prove the equivalence of the above nonclassical problem (4.5)-(4.6) and the con-
structed classical problem (4.7)-(4.8) in the sense that they have the same optimal tra-
jectory and costs. Indeed, if we denote by J∗1 and J
∗
2 the optimal values of problems
(4.5)-(4.6) and (4.7)-(4.8), respectively, then J∗1 ≥ J
∗
2 . On the other hand, suppose that
(u∗, u˜∗) is an optimal control for problem (4.7)-(4.8) and x∗ is the corresponding trajectory,
then control
uˆ(t, x) := u˜∗(t)x+ u∗(t)− u˜∗(t)x∗(t) (4.9)
yields the same trajectory x∗ and thus the same cost in problem (4.5)-(4.6). Consequently,
J∗1 = J
∗
2 and uˆ is an optimal control for the nonclassical problem (4.5)-(4.6). Therefore,
one can substitute ∂u
∂x
for u˜ in the maximum principle for the problem (4.7)-(4.8) and
finally get the maximum principle for the nonclassical problem (4.5)-(4.6) faced by the
leader.
Remark 4.1. Given the leader’s strategy u(t, x)t∈[0,T ], the follower can also solve the
following Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation

∂V2
∂t
+ inf
v∈Rn
{〈
∂V2
∂x
, f(t, x, u(t, x), v)〉+ g2(t, x, u(t, x), v)} = 0,
V2(T, x) = G2(x),
(4.10)
and obtain the optimal feedback strategy
v∗(t, x) = arg inf
v∈Rn
{〈
∂V2
∂x
, f(t, x, u(t, x), v)〉+ g2(t, x, u(t, x), v)}.
However, since V2 depends on the whole function u(·), it is impossible for the leader to
employ dynamic programming to depict his optimal strategy. The maximum principle
approach turns out to be more appropriate for closed-loop Stackelberg games.
4.2 The stochastic case
In this subsection we tackle closed-loop Stackelberg games in the stochastic context, with
the same idea as [20]. After introducing a stochastic disturbance term in the state equation
(4.1), the adjoint equation for the follower, which also acts as the state equation in
the leader’s problem, will be a BSDE rather than an ODE with a terminal condition.
Therefore, the leader will end up with a control problem in which the state equation
consists of a SDE and a BSDE, with the feature that both the control u and its derivative
∂u
∂x
are introduced in the controlled system. With the results on the maximum principle for
control problems of FBSDEs, we present the necessary conditions for the leader’s optimal
strategy to satisfy in a closed-loop Stackelberg game.
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We first introduce the admissible strategy spaces for the leader and the follower
U := {u : u : Ω× [0, T ]× Rn → U is Ft-adapted for any x ∈ R
n, u(t, x) is continuously
differentible in x for any (ω, t) ∈ Ω× [0, T ], and the derivative
∂u
∂x
is bounded},
V := {v : v : Ω× [0, T ]× Rn → V is Ft-adapted for any x ∈ R
n}.
Then, given the leader’s strategy u(t, x), the follower’s optimal response strategy v∗(t, x)
is a solution to the following classical optimal control problem,
min
v∈V
J2 = E
∫ T
0
g2(t, x(t), u(t, x(t)), v(t))dt+ EG2(X(T )), (4.11)
subject to {
dx(t) = f(t, x(t), u(t, x(t)), v(t))dt+ σ(t, x(t))dW (t),
x(0) = x0.
(4.12)
According to the maximum principle, there exists a pair of adapted processes (p2, q2) ∈
S2 ×M2 such that
v∗(t, x(t)) = argmin
v∈V
{〈p2(t), f(t, x(t), u(t, x(t)), v)〉+〈q2, σ(t, x)〉+g2(t, x(t), u(t, x(t)), v)},
(4.13)
and 

dp2(t) =− [(
∂f
∂x
+
∂f
∂u
∂u
∂x
)⊤p2 + (
∂σ
∂x
)⊤q2
+
∂g2
∂x
+ (
∂u
∂x
)⊤
∂g2
∂u
]dt+ q2(t)dW (t),
p2(T ) =
∂G2
∂x
(x(T )),
(4.14)
where x(·) is the solution of (4.12) with policies u(t, x) and v∗(t, x). Suppose for any
leader’s strategy u(t, x), there exists a unique strategy v∗(t, x) for the follower that mini-
mizes his cost functional J2. We also suppose that (4.13) yields v
∗ = ϕ(t, x, u, p2). Then,
taking into account the follower’s optimal response, the leader will be confronted with the
optimal control problem
min
u∈U
J1 = E
∫ T
0
g1(t, x(t), u(t, x(t)), ϕ(t, x(t), u(t, x(t)), p2(t)))dt+ EG1(x(T )) (4.15)
subject to

dx(t) =f(t, x(t), u(t, x(t)), ϕ(t, x(t), u(t, x(t)), p2(t)))dt+ σ(t, x(t))dW (t),
dp2(t) =− [(
∂f
∂x
+
∂f
∂u
∂u
∂x
)⊤p2 + (
∂σ
∂x
)⊤q2
+
∂g2
∂x
+ (
∂u
∂x
)⊤
∂g2
∂u
]dt+ q2(t)dW (t),
x(0) =x0, p2(T ) =
∂G2
∂x
(x(T )).
(4.16)
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It can be seen that, after incorporating the follower’s adjoint variable as an augmented
state, the leader encounters a controlled FBSDE, which is the counterpart of (4.6) in the
deterministic context. For the solvability of FBSDEs, one can refer to [15], [26], [24], [31],
and the references therein. Here we assume that the leader’s problem is well-posed, i.e.,
for each u(·) ∈ U , there exists a unique triple (x, p2, q2) ∈ S
2 × S2 ×M2 solving FBSDE
(4.16). Since the derivative ∂u
∂x
of the control variable u is involved in the BSDE in (4.16),
we apply the techniques in the deterministic case to relate the above nonclassical control
problem to a classical one.
Consider the optimization problem of a controlled FBSDE
min
u1,u2
J(u1(·), u2(·)) = E
∫ T
0
g1(t, x(t), u1(t), ϕ(t, x(t), u1(t), p2(t)))dt+EG1(x(T )), (4.17)
subject to

dx(t) =f(t, x(t), u1(t), ϕ(t, x(t), u1(t), p2(t)))dt+ σ(t, x(t))dW (t),
dp2(t) =− [(
∂f
∂x
+
∂f
∂u
u2)
⊤p2 + (
∂σ
∂x
)⊤q2
+
∂g2
∂x
+ (u2)
⊤∂g2
∂u
]dt + q2(t)dW (t),
x(0) =x0, p2(T ) =
∂G2
∂x
(x(T )),
(4.18)
where u1 and u2 are adapted control variables with values in U and some bounded subset
in Rm1×n, respectively. Again we assume the above problem is well-posed. Obviously, if
we denote by J∗1 and J
∗ the optimal values of problems (4.15)-(4.16) and (4.17)-(4.18),
respectively, then J∗1 ≥ J
∗. On the other hand, if (u∗1, u
∗
2) is a solution to problem (4.17)-
(4.18) and x∗ is the corresponding optimal state trajectory, then we can construct an
optimal control u∗ for problem (4.15)-(4.16) as follows
u∗(t, x) := u∗2(t)x+ u
∗
1(t)− u
∗
2(t)x
∗(t). (4.19)
Therefore, J∗1 = J
∗, which implies that if u∗(t, x) is a solution to problem (4.15)-(4.16)
and x∗ is the corresponding optimal state trajectory, then (u∗(t, x∗(t)), ∂u
∗
∂x
(t, x∗(t))) is an
optimal control for problem (4.17)-(4.18) and leads to the same optimal state trajectory
x∗. Thus we can obtain the maximum principle for problem (4.15)-(4.16) faced by the
leader by means of the necessary conditions satisfied by the optimal control for problem
(4.17)-(4.18) (see, e.g., [27] or [32]). To this end, we define
H1(t, u1, u2, x, y, p1, p2, q1, q2)
= 〈p1, f(t, x, u1, ϕ(t, x, u1, p2))〉+ 〈q1, σ(t, x)〉 − 〈y, (
∂f
∂x
+
∂f
∂u
u2)
⊤p2
+ (
∂σ
∂x
)⊤q2 +
∂g2
∂x
+ (u2)
⊤∂g2
∂u
〉+ g1(t, x, u1, ϕ(t, x, u1, p2)).
(4.20)
Theorem 4.1. Suppose u∗(t, x) is a solution to the leader’s problem (4.15)-(4.16). Then
there exists a triple (y, p1, q1) such that
(u∗(t, x(t)),
∂u∗
∂x
(t, x(t)))
=arg(u1,u2)minH1(t, u
1, u2, x(t), y(t), p1(t), p2(t), q1(t), q2(t))
(4.21)
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and 

dy(t) =−
∂H1
∂p2
dt−
∂H1
∂q2
dW (t),
dp1(t) =−
∂H1
∂x
dt+ q1(t)dW (t),
y(0) = 0, p1(T ) = −
∂2G2
∂x2
(x(T ))y(T ) +
∂G1
∂x
(x(T )),
(4.22)
where (x, p2, q2) is the solution of state equation (4.16) with control u
∗(t, x), and ∂H1
∂p2
, ∂H1
∂q2
and ∂H1
∂x
in (4.22) are evaluated at
(t, u∗(t, x(t)),
∂u∗
∂x
(t, x(t)), x(t), y(t), p1(t), p2(t), q1(t), q2(t)).
Remark 4.2. If u is independent of x, we conclude in comparison with the arguments in
section 3 that the closed-loop Stackelberg solution is reduced to the open-loop Stackelberg
solution and the maximum principles for both cases are identical.
5 The linear quadratic Stackelberg games
In this section we consider linear quadratic open-loop and closed-loop Stackelberg games.
Yong derives the Riccati equation for the open-loop Stackelberg game in [30] where the
weighting matrices of the state and controls in the cost functionals are assumed not
necessarily positive definite, and controls are allowed to appear in the diffusion term. For
the follower’s problem, the author uses the solutions of the follower’s Riccati equation and
a BSDE to give the state feedback representation of the follower’s optimal strategy (one
can also refer to [33, Page 313] for a similar derivation of the state feedback representation
for a linear quadratic stochastic control problem with deterministic coefficients). To be
precise, the author assumes that the follower’s adjoint variable p2 in (5.3) has the affine
form
p2 = Px+ φ.
Applying Itoˆ’s formula to p2 and taking into account (5.1) and (5.3), one can get the
follower’s Riccati equation with respect to P and a BSDE for φ. Then the author views
the above BSDE for φ, which contains the solution of the follower’s Riccati equation and
the leader’s adopted strategy, and the original state equation as the leader’s controlled
system and further derives the leader’s Riccati equation. Under some assumptions the
author also discusses the solvability of the Riccati equations for the case of deterministic
coefficients. Here we consider the follower’s Hamiltonian system (5.4) as the leader’s
controlled state equation and hence the state feedback representation of the Stackelberg
solution can be obtained at the same time for the leader and the follower. As a result,
the corresponding Riccati equation here is of different form from the one in [30]. Since we
deal with the case without decision variables in the diffusion term, we also show, under
some appropriate assumptions, the existence and uniqueness of the solution to the derived
Riccati equation with stochastic coefficients by means of a linear transformation to the
standard stochastic Riccati equation. For the linear quadratic closed-loop Stackelberg
game, we will see that the Hamiltonian system for the leader is no longer linear, which
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prevents us from getting an exogenous Riccati equation if we proceed the same way as
in the open-loop case. Instead, we assume that the forward variable y is linear with
respect to the original state x and derive an exogenous FBSDE which plays the same
role as the Riccati equation in open-loop case. Throughout this section we assume the
coefficients A,Bi, C,Qi, Ri, Gi are adapted bounded matrices, Qi, Ri, Gi are symmetric
and nonnegative, and Ri are uniformly positive, i = 1, 2.
5.1 The open-loop case
The state equation and cost functionals are given as follows.{
dx(t) = (Ax+B1u+B2v)dt+ CxdW (t),
x(0) = x0,
(5.1)
J1(u, v) =
1
2
E[
∫ T
0
(〈Q1x(t), x(t)〉 + 〈R1u(t), u(t)〉)dt+ 〈G1x(T ), x(T )〉],
J2(u, v) =
1
2
E[
∫ T
0
(〈Q2x(t), x(t)〉 + 〈R2v(t), v(t)〉)dt+ 〈G2x(T ), x(T )〉].
(5.2)
Given leader’s strategy u ∈ U , it is well known that the follower’s problem
min
v∈V
J2(u, v) =
1
2
E[
∫ T
0
(〈Q2x(t), x(t)〉+ 〈R2v(t), v(t)〉)dt+ 〈G2x(T ), x(T )〉]
subject to {
dx(t) = (Ax+B1u+B2v)dt+ CxdW (t),
x(0) = x0,
is a standard linear quadratic optimal control problem and the unique solution is
v∗(t) = −R−12 B
⊤
2 p2,
where p2 is the first part of the solution (p2, q2) ∈ S
2 ×M2 to the adjoint equation{
−dp2(t) = (A
⊤p2 + C
⊤q2 +Q2x)dt− q2dW (t),
p2(T ) = G2x(T ).
(5.3)
Then, the leader’s problem is
min
u∈U
J1(u) =
1
2
E[
∫ T
0
(〈Q1x(t), x(t)〉+ 〈R1u(t), u(t)〉)dt+ 〈G1x(T ), x(T )〉]
subject to (the Hamiltonian system of the follower)

dx(t) = (Ax+B1u−B2R
−1
2 B
⊤
2 p2)dt+ CxdW (t),
−dp2(t) = (A
⊤p2 + C
⊤q2 +Q2x)dt− q2dW (t),
x(0) = x0, p2(T ) = G2x(T ).
(5.4)
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The leader’s problem is well-posed since for every u ∈ U , the coefficients of the system
(5.4) satisfy the monotonicity condition proposed by Peng and Wu [26], which yields the
existence and uniqueness of the solution (x, p2, q2) to the system (5.4). Moreover, by
similar arguments of Tang [29], we can get the following estimate
E sup
0≤t≤T
|p2(t)|
2 + E sup
0≤t≤T
|x(t)|2 + E
∫ T
0
|q2(t)|
2dt ≤ L(|x0|
2 + E
∫ T
0
|u(t)|2dt), (5.5)
where L is a positive constant. With this estimate, we can adopt relevant arguments
for standard linear quadratic optimal control problems in [17] and get the fact that the
leader’s objective functional J1(u) is convex in u,
lim
‖u‖→∞
J1(u) =∞,
and J1(u) is Fre´chet differentiable over U with the representation
〈J ′1(u), w〉 =E
∫ T
0
(〈Q1(t)x(t; x0, u), x(t; 0, w)〉+ 〈R1(t)u(t), w(t)〉)dt
+ 〈G1x(T ; x0, u), x(T ; 0, w)〉.
(5.6)
Here we use x(·; x0, u) to represent the solution of (5.4) with initial state x(0) = x0 and
control u. As a conclusion of Proposition 2.1.2 in [11], we know that the leader has a
unique optimal strategy u∗ ∈ U which satisfies J ′1(u
∗) = 0. Now we use dual representation
to characterize the optimal strategy u∗.
Theorem 5.1. For each u ∈ U , there exists a unique solution (x, y, p1, q1, p2, q2) to the
FBSDE

dx(t) = (Ax+B1u− B2R
−1
2 B
⊤
2 p2)dt+ CxdW (t),
−dp2(t) = (A
⊤p2 + C
⊤q2 +Q2x)dt− q2dW (t),
dy(t) = (Ay +B2R
−1
2 B
⊤
2 p1)dt+ CydW (t),
−dp1(t) = (A
⊤p1 + C
⊤q1 −Q2y +Q1x)dt− q1dW (t),
x(0) = x0, y(0) = 0, p1(T ) = −G2y(T ) +G1x(T ), p2(T ) = G2x(T ).
(5.7)
The necessary and sufficient condition for u to be the leader’s optimal strategy is
u(t) = −R−11 B1p1(t).
Proof. It can be seen that the FBSDEs consisting of (x, p2, q2) and (y, p1, q1) are two
decoupled systems. Therefore, for given u ∈ U , we can first get the unique solution
(x, p2, q2) to the equation

dx(t) = (Ax+B1u−B2R
−1
2 B
⊤
2 p2)dt+ CxdW (t),
−dp2(t) = (A
⊤p2 + C
⊤q2 +Q2x)dt− q2dW (t),
x(0) = x0, p2(T ) = G2x(T ).
(5.8)
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Let y˜ := −y. Then FBSDE consisting of (y, p1, q1) in (5.7) can be converted into the
following one 

dy˜(t) = (Ay˜ −B2R
−1
2 B
⊤
2 p1)dt+ Cy˜dW (t),
−dp1(t) = (A
⊤p1 + C
⊤q1 +Q2y˜ +Q1x)dt− q1dW (t),
y˜(0) = 0, p1(T ) = G2y˜(T ) +G1x(T ).
(5.9)
The coefficients in the above system also satisfy the monotonicity condition in [26]. So
there exists a unique solution to (5.9), which also implies the existence and uniqueness of
the solution (x, y, p1, q1, p2, q2) to FBSDE (5.7). The necessary part comes directly from
the maximum principle (3.4) and (3.5). Now we prove the sufficient part. Denote by
(x(·; x0, u), y(·; x0, u), p1(·; x0, u), q1(·; x0, u), p2(·; x0, u), q2(·; x0, u))
and
(x(·; 0, w), y(·; 0, w), p1(·; 0, w), q1(·; 0, w), p2(·; 0, w), q2(·; 0, w))
the solutions to the system of FBSDEs (5.7) with initial states and controls as (x0, u) and
(0, w), respectively. Using Itoˆ’s formula to compute
〈p1(t; x0, u), x(t; 0, w)〉+ 〈p2(t; 0, w), y(t; x0, u)〉
and taking the expectation, we can get
〈J ′1(u), w〉 =E〈G1x(T ; x0, u), x(T ; 0, w)〉
+ E
∫ T
0
〈Q1(t)x(t; x0, u), x(t; 0, w)〉+ 〈R1(t)u(t), w(t)〉dt
=E
∫ T
0
〈R1(t)u(t) +B
⊤
1 (t)p1(t; x0, u), w(t)〉dt.
(5.10)
Obviously u = −R−11 B
⊤
1 p1 makes J
′
1(u) equal to zero, so it is an optimal strategy for the
leader.
From the uniqueness of the optimal strategy, we also know that FBSDE

dx(t) = (Ax− B1R
−1
1 B
⊤
1 p1 − B2R
−1
2 B
⊤
2 p2)dt+ CxdW (t),
−dp2(t) = (A
⊤p2 + C
⊤q2 +Q2x)dt− q2dW (t),
dy(t) = (Ay +B2R
−1
2 B
⊤
2 p1)dt+ CydW (t),
−dp1(t) = (A
⊤p1 + C
⊤q1 −Q2y +Q1x)dt− q1dW (t),
x(0) = x0, y(0) = 0, p1(T ) = −G2y(T ) +G1x(T ), p2(T ) = G2x(T ),
(5.11)
has a unique solution (x, y, p1, q1, p2, q2). And the Stackelberg solution (u
∗, v∗) can be
written as
u∗ = −R−11 B
⊤
1 p1, v
∗ = −R−12 B
⊤
2 p2. (5.12)
In what follows we see (x, y) as the state and derive the feedback representation of the
Stackelberg solution (u∗, v∗) in terms of (x, y). We denote
xˆ =
(
x
y
)
, pˆ =
(
p1
p2
)
, qˆ =
(
q1
q2
)
,
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and
Aˆ =
(
A 0
0 A
)
, Bˆ =
(
B1R
−1
1 B
⊤
1 B2R
−1
2 B
⊤
2
−B2R
−1
2 B
⊤
2 0
)
, Cˆ =
(
C 0
0 C
)
,
Qˆ =
(
Q1 −Q2
Q2 0
)
, Gˆ =
(
G1 −G2
G2 0
)
.
Then FBSDE (5.11) can be rewritten as

dxˆ(t) = (Aˆxˆ(t)− Bˆpˆ(t))dt+ CˆxˆdW (t),
dpˆ(t) = −(Aˆ⊤pˆ+ Cˆ⊤qˆ + Qˆxˆ)dt+ qˆdW (t),
xˆ(0) = 0, pˆ(T ) = Gˆxˆ(T ).
(5.13)
Suppose there is a matrix-valued process K such that
pˆ = Kxˆ, (5.14)
and K has a stochastic differential form
dK(t) =M(t)dt + L(t)dW (t). (5.15)
Applying Itoˆ’s formula to Kxˆ, we get
Mxˆdt+ LxˆdW (t) +K(Aˆxˆ− BˆKxˆ(t))dt+KCˆxˆdW (t) + LCˆxˆdt
=dpˆ(t)
=− (Aˆ⊤Kxˆ+ Cˆ⊤qˆ + Qˆxˆ)dt+ qˆdW (t).
(5.16)
Comparing the diffusion terms in (5.16), we have
qˆ = Lxˆ+KCˆxˆ. (5.17)
Substituting the expression into (5.16) and comparing the drift terms, we get
Mxˆ+K(Aˆxˆ− BˆKxˆ(t)) + LCˆxˆ
=− Aˆ⊤Kxˆ− Cˆ⊤(Lxˆ+KCˆxˆ)− Qˆxˆ,
(5.18)
which yields
M = −KAˆ− Aˆ⊤K +KBˆK − LCˆ − Cˆ⊤L− Cˆ⊤KCˆ − Qˆ.
Therefore, we get the Riccati equation{
dK(t) = −(KAˆ + Aˆ⊤K −KBˆK + LCˆ + Cˆ⊤L+ Cˆ⊤KCˆ + Qˆ)dt+ LdW (t),
K(T ) = Gˆ.
(5.19)
The difference between the above Riccati equation and the standard one from stochastic
LQ problems without control in diffusion terms (see, e.g., [25]) is that Bˆ, Qˆ and Gˆ here
are not symmetric matrices. For n = 1 and under some appropriate assumptions on the
coefficient matrices, we show in the following proposition that Riccati equation (5.19) can
be connected to a standard one through a linear transformation for FBSDE (5.13).
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Proposition 5.2. Suppose that n=1 and α and β are two positive constants such that
Q2
Q1
=
G2
G1
= α,
B2R
−1
2 B
⊤
2
B1R
−1
1 B
⊤
1
= β.
Then, the Riccati equation (5.19) has a unique solution.
Proof. We make the transformation
xˆ = x˜, pˆ = Φp˜, qˆ = Φq˜, (5.20)
where
Φ =
(
1 −2β
2α 1
)
.
Then FBSDE (5.13) can be converted into the following one

dx˜(t) = (A˜x˜(t)− B˜p˜(t))dt+ C˜x˜dW (t),
dp˜(t) = −(A˜⊤p˜+ C˜⊤q˜ + Q˜x˜)dt+ q˜dW (t),
x˜(0) = 0, p˜(T ) = G˜x˜(T ),
(5.21)
where
A˜ = Aˆ, C˜ = Cˆ,
B˜ =
(
B1R
−1
1 B
⊤
1 + 2αB2R
−1
2 B
⊤
2 −B2R
−1
2 B
⊤
2
−B2R
−1
2 B
⊤
2 2βB2R
−1
2 B
⊤
2
)
,
Q˜ =
1
4αβ
(
Q1 + 2βQ2 −Q2
−Q2 2αQ2
)
,
G˜ =
(
G1 + 2βG2 −G2
−G2 2αG2
)
.
Now the matrices B˜, Q˜ and G˜ are symmetric and positive definite. Suppose
p˜ = K˜x˜,
and
dK˜ = K˜1dt+ L˜dW (t).
With the same procedure to derive Riccati equation (5.19), we can get a standard Riccati
equation for (K˜, L˜){
dK˜(t) = −(K˜A˜+ A˜⊤K˜ − K˜B˜K˜ + L˜C˜ + C˜⊤L˜+ C˜⊤K˜C˜ + Q˜)dt+ L˜dW (t),
K˜(T ) = G˜.
(5.22)
According to the results in [8] or [25], or more general case in [29], we know that Riccati
equation (5.22) has a unique solution (K˜, L˜) and
p˜ = K˜x˜, q˜ = (L˜+ K˜C˜)x˜.
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Consequently,
pˆ = Φp˜ = ΦK˜x˜ = ΦK˜xˆ,
qˆ = Φq˜ = Φ(L˜+ K˜C˜)x˜ = Φ(L˜+ K˜C˜)xˆ.
(5.23)
Comparing (5.23) with (5.14) and (5.17), we finally get
K = ΦK˜, L = ΦL˜.
From (5.12) we obtain that the Stackelberg solution (u∗, v∗) has a feedback representation
in terms of the state (x, y).
5.2 The closed-loop case
As pointed out in the deterministic case [20], the relative independence of the leader’s
strategy u and its derivative ∂u
∂x
in a closed-loop Stackelberg game makes the leader so
powerful that his Hamiltonian H is likely to achieve −∞ if there is no restriction on the
derivative ∂u
∂x
. One way to restrict the leader’s strength is to add a penalty term ∂u
∂x
in
his cost functional in order that H is convex with respect to (u, ∂u
∂x
). The other way is to
impose a prior bounds on ∂u
∂x
to retain H finite. In this section we will adopt the latter
way to assume ∂u
∂x
to be bounded since it will appear as the coefficient of the unknowns
in adjoint equations and the boundedness of the derivative ∂u
∂x
implies the well-posedness
of the leader’s problem when affine strategies are adopted. For simplicity, we consider
one-dimensional linear quadratic game, with the state equation and cost functionals of
the two players as follows{
dx(t) = [Ax(t) +B1u(t) +B2v(t)]dt+ Cx(t)dW (t),
x(0) = x0,
and
J1 =
1
2
E[
∫ T
0
(Q1x
2(t) +R1u
2(t))dt+G1x
2(T )],
J2 =
1
2
E[
∫ T
0
(Q2x
2(t) +R2v
2(t))dt+G2x
2(T )].
The admissible strategy spaces from which the leader and the follower choose their strate-
gies are given by
U := {u|u : Ω× [0, T ]× R→ U is Ft-adapted for any x ∈ R, u(t, x) is continuously
differentible in x for any (ω, t) ∈ Ω× [0, T ], and the derivative |
∂u
∂x
| ≤ K
for some postive constant K},
V := {v|v : Ω× [0, T ]× Rn → V is Ft-adapted for any x ∈ R
n}.
Suppose for leader’s each strategy u ∈ U , the follower has a unique optimal response
v∗ ∈ V. From (4.13) we know
v∗ = −R−12 B2p2,
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with p2 satisfying
 dp2(t) = −[(A +B1
∂u
∂x
)p2 + Cq2 +Q2x]dt + q2dW (t),
p2(T ) = G2x(T ).
Therefore the leader’s problem is
min
u∈U
J1 =
1
2
E[
∫ T
0
(Q1x
2(t) +R1u
2(t))dt+G1x
2(T )] (5.24)
subject to 

dx(t) = [Ax(t) +B1u(t, x(t))− R
−1
2 B
2
2p2(t)]dt + Cx(t)dW (t),
dp2(t) = −[(A +B1
∂u
∂x
)p2 + Cq2 +Q2x]dt+ q2dW (t),
x(0) = x0, p2(T ) = G2x(T ).
(5.25)
Suppose that for every u(t, x) ∈ U , there is a unique solution (x, p2, q2) to FBSDE (5.25).
According to the discussions in section 4.2, we know that the leader will lose nothing if
he chooses his strategy among affine functions
u(t, x) = u2(t)x+ u1(t),
with u1 and u2 being adapted processes and |u2| ≤ K. Then the leader’s equivalent
problem can be written as
min
u1,u2
J1 =
1
2
E{
∫ T
0
[Q1x
2(t) +R1(u2(t)x(t) + u1(t))
2]dt+G1x
2(T )} (5.26)
subject to 

dx(t) = [(A+B1u2)x+B1u1 −R
−1
2 B
2
2p2]dt+ Cx(t)dW (t),
dp2(t) = −[(A +B1u2)p2 + Cq2 +Q2x]dt + q2dW (t),
x(0) = x0, p2(T ) = G2x(T ).
(5.27)
For every pair (u1, u2), the monotonicity condition guarantees the existence and unique-
ness of the solution to (5.27). Therefore, the leader’s problem with strategies restricted
being of affine form is well-posed. In what follows we use the maximum principle to get
the Hamiltonian system and related Riccati equation for leader’s problem (5.26)-(5.27).
Denote
H1(t, u1, u2, x, y, p1, p2, q1, q2)
=p1[(A+B1u2)x+B1u1 −R
−1
2 B
2
2p2] + Cxq1
− y[(A+B1u2)p2 + Cq2 +Q2x] +
1
2
[Q1x
2 +R1(u2x+ u1)
2].
(5.28)
To obtain (u∗1, u
∗
2) that minimizes H1(t, u1, u2, x, y, p1, p2, q1, q2), we first fix u2 and mini-
mize H1 with respect to u1. By computation,
u∗1 = −u2x− R
−1
1 B1p1. (5.29)
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Substituting (5.29) into the expression (5.28) of H , we can see the only term containing
u2 is
− B1yp2u2. (5.30)
Therefore, the optimal u∗2 is
u∗2 =


−K, if ∆ > 0,
K, if ∆ < 0,
undefined, if ∆ = 0,
(5.31)
where
∆ := −B1yp2.
To find a candidate of optimal pair (u∗1, u
∗
2), we set
u∗2 :=bang(K,−K; ∆)
:=sgn(B1yp2)K
=sgn(y)sgn(B1p2)K
=sgn(p2)sgn(B1y)K,
where sgn is the sign function defined by
sgn(x) =


1 if x > 0,
0 if x = 0,
−1 if x < 0.
From (5.29) we get
u∗1 = −bang(K,−K; ∆)x− R
−1
1 B1p1. (5.32)
If (u∗1, u
∗
2) ∈ U ×V is a solution to the leader’s problem (5.26)-(5.27), then the maximum
principle yields that there exist adapted processes y, p1, and q1 such that

dx(t) = [(A+B1u
∗
2)x+B1u
∗
1 −R
−1
2 B
2
2p2]dt+ Cx(t)dW (t),
dy(t) = [(A+B1u
∗
2)y +R
−1
2 B
2
2p1]dt+ CydW (t),
dp1(t) = −[(A +B1u
∗
2)p1 + Cq1 −Q2y +Q1x+R1u
∗
2(u
∗
2x+ u
∗
1)]dt+ q1dW (t),
dp2(t) = −[(A +B1u
∗
2)p2 + Cq2 +Q2x]dt + q2dW (t),
x(0) = x0, y(0) = 0, p1(T ) = −G2y(T ) +G1x(T ), p2(T ) = G2x(T ),
u∗1 = −bang(K,−K; ∆)x− R
−1
1 B1p1, u
∗
2 := bang(K,−K; ∆).
(5.33)
Like the open-loop case, we proceed to express the optimal strategy (u∗1, u
∗
2) in a non-
anticipating way by means of the state feedback representation. Substituting the expres-
sions of u∗1 and u
∗
2 into the FBSDE in (5.33), we get

dx(t) = [Ax− R−11 B
2
1p1 − R
−1
2 B
2
2p2]dt + Cx(t)dW (t),
dy(t) = [(A+B1bang(K,−K; ∆))y +R
−1
2 B
2
2p1]dt+ CydW (t)
= [Ay + sgn(p2)K|B1y|+R
−1
2 B
2
2p1]dt + CydW (t),
dp1(t) = −[Ap1 + Cq1 −Q2y +Q1x]dt+ q1dW (t),
dp2(t) = −[(A+B1bang(K,−K; ∆))p2 + Cq2 +Q2x]dt + q2dW (t)
= −[Ap2 + sgn(y)K|B1p2|+ Cq2 +Q2x]dt + q2dW (t),
x(0) = x0, y(0) = 0, p1(T ) = −G2y(T ) +G1x(T ), p2(T ) = G2x(T ).
(5.34)
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In contrast to FBSDE (5.11) in the open-loop case, the presence of the additional nonlinear
term bang(K,−K; ∆) in FBSDE (5.34) makes it a nonlinear system. Moreover, the
Lipschitz continuity assumption usually made for the coefficients in the literature does
not hold here. Therefore, the existence and uniqueness of the solution to (5.34), as far as
we know, is still not available. On the other hand, if we still view (x, y) as the “state”
and represent (p1, p2) in terms of (x, y) as in the open-loop case, we can not derive an
exogenous Riccati equation. Instead, we only see x as the state and suppose
y(t) = ξ(t)x(t), p1(t) = η(t)x(t), p2(t) = ζ(t)x(t), (5.35)
and
dξ(t) = ξ1(t)dt+ ξ2(t)dW (t),
dη(t) = η1(t)dt+ η2(t)dW (t),
dζ(t) = ζ1(t)dt+ ζ2(t)dW (t).
(5.36)
By Itoˆ’s formula and in view of (5.35)
dy(t) =ξ(t)dx(t) + x(t)dξ(t) + Cx(t)ξ2(t)dt
=ξ(t)[Ax− R−11 B
2
1p1 − R
−1
2 B
2
2p2]dt + Cξ(t)x(t)dW (t)
+ ξ1(t)x(t)dt + ξ2(t)x(t)dW (t) + Cξ2(t)x(t)dt
={[A− R−11 B
2
1η(t)−R
−1
2 B
2
2ζ(t)]ξ(t)
+ ξ1(t) + Cξ2(t)}x(t)dt + [Cξ(t) + ξ2(t)]x(t)dW (t).
(5.37)
On the other hand,
dy(t) =[(A+B1bang(K,−K; ∆))y +R
−1
2 B
2
2p1]dt+ CydW (t)
=[(A+B1bang(K,−K; ∆˜))ξ(t) +R
−1
2 B
2
2η(t)]x(t)dt+ Cξ(t)x(t)dW (t),
(5.38)
where
∆˜ := −B1ξ(t)ζ(t).
Comparing (5.37) and (5.38), we have
ξ2(t) =0,
ξ1(t) =[R
−1
1 B
2
1η(t) +R
−1
2 B
2
2ζ(t) +B1bang(K,−K; ∆˜)]ξ(t) +R
−1
2 B
2
2η(t).
With the same procedure, we can get{
η1(t) =[R
−1
1 B
2
1η(t) +R
−1
2 B
2
2ζ(t)− 2A− C
2]η(t) +Q2ξ(t)− 2Cη2(t)−Q1,
ζ1(t) =[R
−1
1 B
2
1η(t) +R
−1
2 B
2
2ζ(t)− 2A− C
2 −B1bang(K,−K; ∆˜)]ζ(t)− 2Cζ2(t)−Q2.
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Therefore, we derive the related Riccati equation for problem (5.26)-(5.27)

dξ(t) ={[R−11 B
2
1η(t) +R
−1
2 B
2
2ζ(t) +B1bang(K,−K; ∆˜)]ξ(t) +R
−1
2 B
2
2η(t)}dt
={[R−11 B
2
1η(t) +R
−1
2 B
2
2ζ(t)]ξ(t) + sgn(ζ(t))|B1ξ(t)|+R
−1
2 B
2
2η(t)}dt,
dη(t) ={[R−11 B
2
1η(t) +R
−1
2 B
2
2ζ(t)− 2A− C
2]η(t) +Q2ξ(t)− 2Cη2(t)
−Q1}dt+ η2(t)dW (t),
dζ(t) ={[R−11 B
2
1η(t) +R
−1
2 B
2
2ζ(t)− 2A− C
2 −B1bang(K,−K; ∆˜)]ζ(t)
− 2Cζ2(t)−Q2}dt+ ζ2(t)dW (t)
={[R−11 B
2
1η(t) +R
−1
2 B
2
2ζ(t)− 2A− C
2]ζ(t)− sgn(ξ(t))|B1ζ(t)|
− 2Cζ2(t)−Q2}dt+ ζ2(t)dW (t),
ξ(0) =0, η(T ) = −G2ξ(T ) +G1, ζ(T ) = G2.
Suppose (ξ, η, ζ, η2, ζ2) is a solution to the above FBSDE and x
∗ solves the linear SDE{
dx(t) = [A−R−11 B
2
1η − R
−1
2 B
2
2ζ ]x(t)dt+ Cx(t)dW (t),
x(0) = x0.
Then we can use Itoˆ’s formula to verify that
y(t) :=ξ(t)x∗(t), p1(t) := η(t)x
∗(t), p2(t) := ζ(t)x
∗(t),
q1(t) :=[Cη(t) + η2(t)]x
∗(t), q2(t) := [Cζ(t) + ζ2(t)]x
∗(t),
together with x∗ solve the leader’s Hamiltonian system (5.34). Therefore,
u(t, x) = bang(K,−K; ∆˜)x− bang(K,−K; ∆˜)x∗(t)− R−11 B1η(t)x
∗(t)
with ∆˜ = −B1ξ(t)ζ(t) is a candidate of the leader’s optimal strategy.
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